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RECONSIDERING BOARD




The financial crisis has yielded significant losses for sharehold-
ers, and for the greater society. Shareholder suits arguing that boards
should have been more active monitors have failed. We argue here
for an expansion of board monitoring duties. The crisis suggests that
corporations may sometimes abuse the privilege of limited liability.
Boards should be charged with monitoring for risks arising from
corporations' operations and procedures (including their compensa-
tion practices) that might significantly harm both shareholders and
society at large.
I. INTRODUCTION
A suit alleging a breach of fiduciary duty by reason of a board's
failure to monitor has famously been characterized as one of the hardest
for shareholders to win.' Indeed, this characterization follows logically
and directly from the way in which fiduciary duties have come to be ar-
ticulated. After Stone v. Ritter, the duty at issue in board monitoring
would be the duty of good faith, now subsumed within the duty of loyal-
ty.2 A breach of the duty of good faith requires affirmative bad faith-in
this context, an intentional failure to act, in conscious disregard of one's
duty to act.3 But conceptually, grammatically, and logically, most exam-
ples of "failures" that come readily to mind are passive, not active-
hence the extreme difficulty plaintiffs have in prevailing.
The financial crisis helps make the case that boards should do more
* We thank Daniel Sokol and participants at the In the Boardroom: Corporate Governance
Meets The Real World symposium for helpful comments.
1. See In re Caremark Int'l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996); see also
Robert T. Miller, The Board's Duty to Monitor Risk After Citigroup, 12 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 1153, 1163
(2010).
2. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369-70 (Del. 2006); see also Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell,
Executive Compensation and the Optimal Penumbra of Delaware Corporate Law, 4 VA. L. & Bus.
REv. 333, 341 (2009).
3. See Hill & McDonnell, supra note 2, at 342, 343 n.37, 353.
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monitoring. Corporate behavior in the crisis yielded enormous negative
externalities for the greater society. Corporations were able and inclined
to behave in a manner that imposed externalities because of a privilege
the society, or more precisely the state, grants them: their owners get lim-
ited liability.' Given that privilege, and the fact that it can incentivize
risky behavior that yields negative externalities, it seems appropriate that
boards do more to prevent the abuse of the privilege. Indeed, they are
well situated to do so. The risks at issue are also risks to shareholders: an
economy of scope exists.
A motivating example involves compensation. Shareholders recent-
ly lost a lawsuit in which they argued that Goldman Sachs's compensa-
tion practices incentivized risky behavior, and that the directors, having
put in place these practices, ought to have been monitoring to make sure
the risks thus incentivized were appropriate.' We agree with the Gold-
man shareholders that directors should have been doing precisely this
type of monitoring. We potentially part ways with the Goldman share-
holders on the issue of liability: we think the board monitoring duty at
issue may more realistically and perhaps even more desirably belong in
what we and others have called the penumbra, as Caremark6 duties
themselves do. Boards should be encouraged to monitor for risks to the
company and its shareholders that might also yield sizeable negative ex-
ternalities, but the set of cases in which they should be liable for doing so
is small, and should not encompass a case like Goldman. We have previ-
ously written on this mechanism of Delaware law, in which judges, in
their opinions and in articles and speeches, and lawyer memos written to
clients explaining Delaware law, significantly affect behavior, describing
"duties" (like the Caremark duty) the breach of which would almost cer-
tainly not yield liability.' We think such a duty in this context would be a
step forward-a way in which the crisis can improve corporate govern-
ance. Cases like In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation,'
in which plaintiffs lost a suit against directors for failing to monitor Citi's
exposure to the subprime mortgage market, and Goldman, and indeed
the financial crisis more broadly, raise the issue of whether corporate
governance appropriately has as an aim minimizing harm to society. Our
4. One of us is proposing, in an article and forthcoming book with a coauthor, that bankers in
investment banks have some measure of personal liability for the negative externalities their banks
may cause. Investment banks are now corporations; until a few decades ago, however, they were
mostly organized as general partnerships, and their ability and incentive to impose externalities was
thus significantly constrained. See Claire Hill & Richard Painter, Berle's Vision Beyond Shareholder
Interests: Why Investment Bankers Should Have (Some) Personal Liability, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
1173, 1177 (2010).
5. In re Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. S'holder Litig., No. 5215-VCG, 2011 WL 4826104, at *1-2,
*23 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2011).
6. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 959.
7. See generally Hill & McDonnell, supra note 2; see also Lyman Johnson, Counter-Narrative in
Corporate Law: Saints and Sinners, Apostles and Epistles, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 847. 873; Julian Ve-
lasco, The Role of Aspiration in Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 519 (2012).
8. 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009).
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answer to this question is yes, within limits; our account and proposal
here attempt to explain and justify this answer.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The leading cases defining the board oversight duty are Caremark'
and Stone v. Ritter." In Caremark, employees committed a series of vio-
lations of the Anti-Referral Payments Law." The board was not aware
of these violations and did not directly authorize them-if it had, the case
would have involved the duty not to engage in knowing violations of the
law.12 Instead, the plaintiffs complained that the board did not take ade-
quate steps to ensure that the corporation and its employees complied
with the law. Delaware Supreme Court precedent at the time held that
the board was not responsible for illegal behavior by lower-level employ-
ees unless there had been red flags signaling cause for suspicion.14 Chan-
cellor Allen argued, however, that intervening developments had created
a somewhat stronger duty. Even in the absence of red flags, boards have
a duty "to assure that a corporate information and reporting sys-
tem. . . exists.""5 He grounded this conclusion on three factors:
Modern case law is increasingly serious about the role of the board;
Information is essential to the supervisory and monitoring role of the
board; and
The federal sentencing guidelines encourage a monitoring system."
The duty to monitor in Caremark has limited bite, however.
"[O]nly a sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise over-
sight-such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable infor-
mation and reporting system [exists]-will establish the lack of good faith
that is a necessary condition to liability." 7
The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed Caremark as good law a
decade later in Stone. It caught some (indeed, perhaps, most) commen-
tators and people in the corporate world off-guard by categorizing (1)
Caremark as a case about the directors' duty to act in good faith, and (2)
the duty of good faith as part of the duty of loyalty, not the duty of care."
The court framed the duty to monitor as follows:
9. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 959.
10. 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
11. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 961-62.
12. Id. at 971.
13. Id. at 961.
14. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963).
15. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970.
16. Id. at 969.
17. Id. at 971.
18. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 373 (Del. 2006).
19. Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Essay, Stone v. Ritter and the Expanding Duty of Loy-
alty, 76 FORDHAM L. REv. 1769,1769 (2007).
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We hold that Caremark articulates the necessary conditions predi-
cate for director oversight liability: (a) the directors utterly failed to
implement any reporting or information system or controls, or (b)
having implemented such a system or controls, consciously failed to
monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling themselves from
being informed of risks or problems requiring their attention.20
A critical question is whether the Caremark oversight duty extends
beyond the monitoring of legal compliance risk to the monitoring of
business risk more generally. In Caremark itself, Chancellor Allen
seemed to suggest that it does. He said that the board should assure that
information and reporting systems exist in the organization that are
reasonably designed to provide to senior management and to the
board itself timely, accurate information sufficient to allow man-
agement and the board, each within its scope, to reach informed
judgments concerning both the corporation's compliance with law
and its business performance.21
However, Delaware courts have not yet clearly held that the oversight
duty extends beyond legal compliance.
The first case to most nearly confront the issue is one of the leading
post-financial crisis cases, In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Lit-
igation.22 The plaintiffs claimed that the board had failed to adequately
monitor Citigroup's exposure to the subprime lending market. The
court dismissed the case rather, well, dismissively, except (interestingly)for a waste claim concerning the retiring CEO's compensation package.
Chancellor Chandler was clearly quite reluctant to recognize a duty to
monitor general business risk, fearing that such a duty would lead to ju-
dicial second-guessing of board decisions, precisely the sort of second-
guessing that the business judgment rule is meant to block." Based on
such reasoning, he came very close to saying that there is no duty to
monitor general business risk, although he perhaps did not quite go that
far.26 Some academic commentators have celebrated this reasoning.2 7
However, even one of the most staunch defenders of board authority,
Stephen Bainbridge, has acknowledged that legal compliance and gen-
eral risk management do not differ in kind, and that there is no clear line
between the oversight in Caremark and in Citigroup. (That being said,
Bainbridge does maintain-as do we-that the chances of being held lia-
ble should be even more infinitesimally small in the Citigroup context
20. Stone, 911 A.2d at 370.
21. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970 (emphasis added); see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark
and Enterprise Risk Management, 34 J. CORP. L. 967, 980 (2009).
22. 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009).
23. Id. at 114.
24. Id. at 138.
25. Id. at 131.
26. See id.
27. Robert T. Miller, Oversight Liability for Risk-Management Failures at Financial Firms, 84 S.
CAL. L. REv. 47, 100 (2010).
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than they are in the Caremark context.)
A second crisis-related case against a leading financial company also
addressed the duty to monitor business risk. The plaintiffs in In re
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. Shareholder Litigation29 claimed that the
Goldman executive and employee compensation scheme was approved
in bad faith because it was structured to encourage excessive risk and to
divert assets to the employees. The plaintiffs also raised a Caremark
board oversight claim.3  After disposing of the compensation-setting
claims, Vice-Chancellor Glasscock turned to the Caremark claim. Like
us, he found Citigroup ambiguous as to whether any duty exists to moni-
tor business risk.31 He then, as in Citigroup but more explicitly so, evad-
ed deciding the question by saying that insofar as there may be such a du-
ty, it was not violated.32
As in Citigroup, the Goldman Sachs court stresses that it is not a vi-
olation of the board's duty to take on a high degree of risk." However,
the plaintiffs in Goldman Sachs made a more subtle claim: "According to
the Plaintiffs, after the Director Defendants created Goldman's compen-
sation structure, they had a duty to ensure protection from abuses by
management, which were allegedly made more likely due to the form of
that structure."3 4 We argue below that this is a promising and important
argument. Disappointingly, the court drops this point after stating it,
never really responding to the argument.
As noted above, cases dealing with the monitoring of legal compli-
ance by employees differ from those dealing with deliberate lawbreaking
sanctioned by the board itself. The latter category is also of interest to us
here, since it ties into our discussion of the role of externalities, and of
interests other than the wealth of shareholders. Deliberate violation of
the law would appear to violate the board's duty even where such viola-
tion is on net profitable. There are very few cases addressing this issue
explicitly.35  The leading case is Miller v. AT&T.3 6 Dicta in Delaware
suggest that directors do indeed violate their duty by sanctioning any sort
of deliberate lawbreaking. Most significantly, in a key passage (later en-
dorsed by the Delaware Supreme Court) setting out the contours of good
faith in the Disney opinion, Chancellor Chandler said that a
failure to act in good faith may be shown, for instance, where the
fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other than that of ad-
vancing the best interests of the corporation, where the fiduciary
28. Bainbridge, supra note 21, at 981.
29. CA No. 5215-VCG, 2011 WL 4826104 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12,2011).
30. Id. at *1-2. The plaintiffs also raised a waste claim.
31. Id. at *21-22.
32. Id. at *23.
33. Id. at *22.
34. Id. at *19.
35. Thomas A. Uebler, Shareholder Police Power: Shareholders' Ability to Hold Directors Ac-
countable for Intentional Violations of Law, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 199, 206 n.35 (2008).
36. 507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974).
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acts with the intent to violate applicable positive law, or where the fi-
duciary intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to act,
demonstrating a conscious disregard for his duties."
A tougher and less-settled question concerns the calculation of
damages. Should the harm caused by the legal violation be offset by any
gain created by it? Where a crime is actually profitable, this could lead
to no damage remedy at all. The Miller court, following New York state
court precedent, stated that to be cognizable as an element of damages,
the loss caused by the violation must outweigh the gains it produced.38
The American Law Institute, in contrast, suggests that such offsetting is
not proper.39
As we discuss later, the appropriate damage measure may depend
in part upon whether the underlying rationale supporting a duty not to
violate the law is controlling agency costs within the corporation, or
whether it also includes the goal of reducing significant negative exter-
nalities, such as costs associated with activities that society has decided to
prohibit. Stated differently, do fiduciary duties run solely to sharehold-
ers or to other corporate stakeholders as well?40 The debate is an active
one. Many states have adopted corporate constituency statutes that pro-
vide that directors and officers may (and in one case, must) act on behalf
of specified groups beyond just shareholders.41 Delaware has no constit-
uency statute. Delaware's case law is not entirely clear and consistent.
In at least one type of situation, where the board has decided to put con-
trol of the corporation up for sale, its duty is focused solely upon receiv-
ing the best return for shareholders. 42 In other circumstances, though,
the courts say that the board may consider the interests of other constit-
uencies, although the consequences if those interests directly conflict
with those of shareholders are not clear. 43 Where a corporation is near-
ing insolvency, it appears to have an explicit duty to consider the inter-
ests of one specific nonshareholder group, namely creditors," although
that group does not have standing to sue to enforce that duty.45
As we also discuss, the status of the oversight duty of boards may
depend in part upon, and certainly interacts strongly with, related re-
quirements under federal law. Financial companies face much more reg-
ulation concerning risk taking than do other corporations. Banks face
probably the strictest regulation, being constantly monitored by examin-
ers and graded on the safety and soundness of their operation. Insurance
companies face extensive prudential regulation at the state level. Under
new Rule 15c3-5, 46 certain broker-dealers are required to maintain a sys-
tem of risk management control and supervisory procedures.
There are several provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act of particular
interest for our discussion. All the provisions will become effective upon
37. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693,755 (Del. Ch. 2005) (emphasis added);
see also Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 934 (Del. Ch. 2007); Metro Commc'n Corp. BVI v. Ad-
vanced Mobilecomm Techs., Inc., 854 A.2d 121, 131-32 (Del. Ch. 2004).
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rule-making by the appropriate agency." The main one is Section
165(h), which requires certain bank holding companies and certain non-
bank financial companies to establish risk committees that will
(A) be responsible for the oversight of the enterprisewide risk
management practices of the nonbank financial company super-
vised by the Board of Governors or bank holding company ...
(B) include such number of independent directors as the Board of
Governors may determine appropriate, based on the nature of op-
erations, size of assets, and other appropriate criteria related to the
nonbank financial company supervised by the Board of Governors
or a bank holding company . . ; and
(C) include at least 1 risk management expert having experience in
identifying, assessing, and managing risk exposures of large, com-
plex firms.48
Other provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act of particular interest for
our discussion will restrict compensation at certain financial institutions
that would encourage inappropriate risk taking49 and require certain
"covered financial institutions" to provide extensive disclosure concern-
ing incentive-based compensation sufficient to determine whether such
compensation could lead to material financial loss for the institution."o
Finally, bank examiners are now taking into account compensation and
the incentives it creates in evaluating safety and soundness."
Within federal securities law, nonfinancial companies also have
some significant regulation of their risk management systems, although
certainly less extensive than that facing financial companies. Under the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), public companies are required to have audit
38. Miller, 507 F.2d at 763 n.5.
39. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.18(c) (1994); see Uebler, supra note 35, at 216-20.
40. For a good concise discussion, see Ian B. Lee, The Role of the Public Interest in Corporate
Law, in THE RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 106 (Claire A. Hill &
Brett H. McDonnell eds., 2012).
41. Brett H. McDonnell, Corporate Constituency Statutes and Employee Governance, 30 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1227, 1228 (2004); see also Anthony Bisconti, The Double Bottom Line: Can Con-
stituency Statutes Protect Socially Responsible Corporations Stuck in Revlon Land?, 42 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 765, 780-86 (2009).
42. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173,185 (Del. 1986).
43. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,493 A.2d 946,959 (Del. 1985).
44. Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc'n Corp., No. 12150, 1991 WL
277613, at *1155-56 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
45. N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 103 (Del.
2007).
46. Risk Management Controls for Brokers or Dealers with Market Access, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.15c3-5 (2010).
47. See, e.g., Implementing the Dodd-Frank Act: The Federal Reserve Board's Role, BOARD OF
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform-milestones
proposed-rules-being-finalized.htm (last updated Dec. 5, 2012); Implementing Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act-Accomplishments, U.S. SEC. AND EXCHANGE COMM'N,
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/accomplishments.shtml (last updated Mar. 4,2013).
48. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub L. No. 111-203,
§ 165(h)(3), 124 Stat. 1376, 1429-30 (2011) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365).
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committees composed of only independent directors.5 2 The CEO and
CFO must certify as to the company's internal controls," and the outside
auditor must also attest as to those controls.54 Disclosure rules adopted
in 2009 require companies to discuss the board's role in risk oversight
and how compensation policies may affect risk management."
With this as backdrop, we now turn to discussing how board moni-
toring duties fit within the broad spectrum of fiduciary duties.
III. AN ENHANCED DUTY TO MONITOR
Fiduciary duties can be arrayed along a continuum of increasing ju-
dicial scrutiny. Traditional loyalty is at one end, and involves careful ju-
dicial scrutiny; traditional care is at the other, and involves enormous ju-
dicial deference in the form of the business judgment rule. These are the
easier cases. There is a vast middle ground, in which the law has more
difficulty. We have argued elsewhere that the taint of interest accounts
for much of the middle ground.56 Consider in this regard the doctrines
concerning takeovers. Because entrenchment is a possibility, courts scru-
tinize far more than they would in cases raising the possibility of generic
inattention. The taint of interest, broadly construed, also includes struc-
tural bias. Examples include reflexively rubber-stamping a decision to
hire at above-market terms an executive the CEO selected and proposed,
without much inquiry or negotiation on compensation."
The middle ground also contains what we have called conduct in-
volving illegality." Where the board engages in such conduct, liability re-
sults. Where what is at issue is preventing illegal conduct by others, es-
pecially low-level others, Caremark and Stone set forth what a board
must do to avoid liability-not much-and what it should do-rather
more, abide by its Caremark duties.59 The rationale supporting the
board's duties regarding illegal conduct is not crystal clear, but the most
intelligible construction includes harm to shareholders and harm to soci-
ety." In this it differs importantly from the canonical fiduciary duty ra-
tionale, which is harm to shareholders and more particularly, agency
49. Id.; see also id. § 956, 124 Stat. at 1905-06 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5641).
50. Id. § 956, 124 Stat. at 1905-06.
51. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, COMMERCIAL BANK
EXAMINATION MANUAL § 4008.1 (2010).
52. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 775-77 (2002) (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2006)).
53. Id. § 302, 116 Stat. at 777 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241).
54. Id. § 404, 116 Stat. at 789 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7262).
55. Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, Securities Act Release No. 33-9089, Exchange Act Release
No. 34-61175, 74 Fed. Reg. 68334, 68344, 68347 (Dec. 23, 2009).
56. Hill & McDonnell, supra note 19, at 1780-81.
57. See id.




RECONSIDERING BOARD OVERSIGHT DUTIES
costs, where the agent-managers are benefiting themselves at the ex-
pense of the principal, the corporation (and its shareholders).6 1 Indeed,
some types of illegal conduct may benefit shareholders, at least mone-
tarily: the bribe, to a foreign official, to get business that is either not de-
tected, or elicits a fine smaller than the increased profits on account of
the business obtained by means of the bribe. Let us consider various
leading rationales for the Caremark duty to monitor legal compliance,
and for each ask whether that rationale justifies broadening to a duty to
monitor business risk generally.
A. The Monitoring Board
We start with the rationales that Chancellor Allen actually gives in
Caremark. His first two reasons are closely related, focusing on modern
cases emphasizing the board's role and on the need for information if the
board is to fulfill that role.6 2 If we look at board practices today, does the
understanding of the duty to monitor stop at the monitoring of legal
compliance? Hardly. Indeed, frequently it will be hard to even clearly
distinguish monitoring aimed at legal compliance and other kinds of
monitoring-there are important economies of scope in monitoring legal
compliance, financial information required for, among other things, secu-
rities law compliance, and business risk more generally. Moreover, best
practice today involves quite vigorous and widespread monitoring of the
various risks that a business assumes. Increasingly, guidance as to how
such monitoring should occur has been advanced under the label of "en-
terprise risk management."" The leading authoritative guidance on en-
terprise risk management comes from the Committee of Sponsoring Or-
ganizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO)."4 Delaware case law
often both draws upon and reinforces corporate best practices.65 Today,
those best practices clearly include intense efforts at enterprise risk man-
agement.
61. Id. at 1784-85.
62. In re Caremark Int'l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996).
63. Bainbridge, supra note 21, at 969; Michelle M. Harner, Barriers to Effective Risk Manage-
ment, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1323, 1328 (2010); Kristin N. Johnson, Addressing Gaps in the Dodd-
Frank Act: Directors' Risk Management Oversight Obligations, 45 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 55, 58
(2011); Betty Simkins & Steven A. Ramirez, Enterprise-Wide Risk Management and Corporate Gov-
ernance, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 571, 577 (2008).
64. COMMITTEE OF SPONSORING ORGANIZATIONS OF THE TREADWAY COMM'N, ENTERPRISE
RISK MANAGEMENT- INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2004) [hereinafter RISK
MANAGEMENT], available at http://www.coso.org/documents/COSOERMExecutiveSummary.pdf.
65. As our discussion above indicates, Caremark is a leading example. Another example would
be Disney and executive compensation. See Hill & McDonnell, supra note 2, at 347-48.
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B. Sentencing Guidelines and Other Legal Guidance
The third rationale that Chancellor Allen gave in Caremark con-
cerned the federal sentencing guidelines.66 These guidelines give compa-
nies strong reason to put in place a legal compliance oversight program
in order to reduce or eliminate organizational criminal liability for the
acts of employees. 67 Do other areas of law today create a similar argu-
ment for more generalized board monitoring? We think so. For all pub-
lic companies there are the SOX audit committee and internal control
rules and the new disclosure rules on risk management discussed above. 68
For financial companies, there are a variety of stricter risk management
requirements scattered throughout the rules of different areas of finan-
cial regulation.69 For all companies, but particularly financial companies,
a clear imperative exists to engage in a serious risk management pro-
gram, or face a variety of possible sources of legal liability.
C. Agency Costs
As noted above, we see agency costs and the potential of interested
motivation and structural bias as central to the justification for most
forms of judicial scrutiny stronger than the duty of care. Do such con-
cerns justify the Caremark duty to monitor legal compliance, and if so, do
they justify a more general monitoring duty? We have struggled with
that question in the context of the duty to monitor legal compliance. We
previously argued that:
[T]he directors' willingness to tolerate or engage in illegal conduct
may be a proxy for their willingness to engage in conduct that more
directly diverges with the shareholders' interests. Someone who sets
out to break the law often displays stealth and a willingness to pur-
sue a more parochial interest over a competing more general inter-
est: their own personal interest over the interests of others, their
family or friends' interests over that of strangers, or their corpora-
tions' interests over more general social welfare. Those very traits
also characterize those prone to steal from their corporations. 70
We do not think that particular agency cost argument applies in the
context of oversight of business risk. However, in considering possible
agency-controlling justifications for the Caremark duty, we previously
advanced another argument which we think does apply:
Perhaps another justification for the Caremark line of cases is that
internal control systems that monitor illegal behavior tend to over-
lap with internal control systems that monitor fraudulent behavior.
66. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970.
67. Id.
68. See supra notes 52-54.
69. See supra notes 47-49.
70. Hill & McDonnell, supra note 19, at 1784.
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A board that leaves its corporation open to subordinates breaking
the law is also likely to be vulnerable to top officers who choose to
steal from the corporation.7 1
This argument does seem to generalize to monitoring business risk
more broadly. As noted above, there are economies of scope in monitor-
ing illegal behavior, financial information, and risk more generally. In-
deed, top officers not infrequently have compensation packages that re-
ward certain types of risk taking; these officers cause the corporation to
take risks for which they would be rewarded, and try to conceal the risks
taken by hindering board monitoring of risk more broadly. Stephen
Bainbridge makes these two points well:
[A] corporation's failure to adopt effective enterprise risk manage-
ment may often be attributable to resistance by the CEO and top
management. Stock options and related pay-for-performance com-
pensation schemes give management incentives to prefer high vola-
tility. Because boards can use enterprise risk management not only
to manage risk, but also as a monitoring device, CEOs may resist
implementation or effective operation of risk management pro-
grams.72
More directly, monitoring of business risk will naturally help in re-
ducing agency costs for employees below the board and top officer level.
Indeed, such monitoring is one of the main functions of the modern
board, and limiting agency costs below the board level is obviously criti-
cal to the profitable operation of a large corporation. That point is, how-
ever, just as obvious to boards and top officers as it is to courts and to us,
indeed more so, so the question for courts and for us is whether limiting
lower level agency costs is a compelling justification for imposing any
sort of monitoring duty on the board, as opposed to simply letting the
board decide how much monitoring, if any, is enough.
D. Externalities
Although agency arguments may justify both Caremark itself and its
extension to a more general risk oversight duty, the fit is not great. The
same is true for the duty to not deliberately violate the law. All of these
duties fall close to the care end of the care/loyalty spectrum, and indeed,
the chances of legal liability for violating these duties are slim, reflecting
that fact. We suspect, however, that other considerations also do and
should influence the willingness of courts to impose some scrutiny in
71. Id. at 1785; see also Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, Earnings Management, Cor-
porate Tax Shelters, and Book-Tax Alignment, 62 NAT'L TAX. J. 169, 183-84 (2009) ("This research
points to an alternative view, emphasizing that tax avoidance demands obfuscatory actions that can be
bundled with diversionary activities, including earnings manipulation, to advance the interests of man-
agers rather than shareholders.").
72. Bainbridge, supra note 21, at 981. (Yes, that Bainbridge. We were surprised too.)
73. Hill & McDonnell, supra note 19, at 1792.
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these areas. We have made this point before with respect to conduct in-
volving illegality:
[W]e may regard illegal acts as contrary to shareholders' interests
notwithstanding that they might be in shareholders' pecuniary in-
terests. Shareholders are also citizens, and insofar as laws advance
the general social welfare, citizens care about that. A diversified
shareholder with small stakes in any one corporation may well find
that the public interest predominates over the corporate interest.
The other possible account, rather less neat from a doctrinal per-
spective, is that, because corporations are chartered by the state,
they owe a duty to the public, which may include the shareholders,
not to act illegally.7 4
The rationale for imposing fiduciary duties on boards with respect
to conduct involving illegality thus does not fit comfortably into the typi-
cal agency cost analysis. Rather, it considers harm to shareholders that
may result from behavior that may or may not benefit the corporation's
managers. It opens the door to consideration of harm to the public as
well. One of our main points is this: the rationale applies equally well to
risks from business activities -risks that are potentially exceedingly
damaging.
We think the financial crisis helps make the case that board moni-
toring should extend to conduct potentially imposing significant harm on
shareholders, especially where that conduct can also significantly harm
third parties. In the financial crisis, corporate behavior caused apprecia-
ble harm to the greater society and harm to shareholders," sometimes
presenting with canonical agency costs and sometimes not. Illegality was
part of the story, but ultimately not that important a part. Investment
banks are among the corporations whose behavior caused the most
harm. They have been charged with various types of illegal conduct in
connection with the crisis, and investigations are continuing." But the
illegality, while not beside the point, is in fact not the point. There was
considerable harm done simply by aggressive risk taking (including in-
vesting in complex and new financial instruments) and apparently shod-
dy due diligence (in structuring, selling, and also buying those instru-
74. Id. at 1784-85; see also Anne Tucker, The Citizen Shareholder: Modernizing the Agency Par-
adigm to Reflect How and Why a Majority ofAmericans Invest the Market, 35 SEATrLE U. L. REV.
1299 (2012).
75. We assume for purposes of this discussion that we can fairly characterize corporate behavior
in the financial crisis as "harming shareholders." We acknowledge, of course, that it would not be fair
to judge harm purely ex post: that a big risk that could enormously have benefited shareholders failed
is not cognizable harm without more, we think. We therefore assume for purposes of this discussion
that there is something more than simply symmetrically large risk that shareholders might ex ante
choose with full information-perhaps a higher-level or lower-level employee compensation structure
that encourages the risk taking and asymmetrically rewards it.
76. See, e.g., U.S. SECURMES AND EXCHANGE COMM'N, http://www.sec.gov (last visited Mar. 5,
2013) (publishing many press releases on settlements with Citigroup, JP Morgan, Goldman Sachs and
other banks).
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ments)." To illustrate the point, consider two polar cases: the smart, cor-
rupt executives who are bribed to overlook the low quality of mortgages
they securitize, and the stupid, harried executives who simply do not no-
tice. Same harm, vastly different liability to the SEC (and others).
Financial companies caused the greatest harm during the crisis be-
cause they posed the greatest systemic risk to the economy.8 Financial
companies have high leverage, and also typically have a mismatch be-
tween the maturity of their assets and liabilities.7 ' This makes them sub-
ject to contagious panics. Their critical role in the key capitalist task of
raising and allocating capital, as well as other key functions such as pay-
ment systems and the transmission of monetary policy, mean that finan-
cial crises usually wreak havoc on the general economy." The much
stronger legal regime for regulating risk and risk management by finan-
cial companies discussed above is legal recognition of this systemic risk.
And the much greater legal restrictions on financial companies turn their
monitoring issues into a conventional Caremark duty to monitor legal
compliance. Even large nonfinancial companies, however, pose some
degree of systemic risk. When speculative booms occur across the econ-
omy, many businesses shortsightedly take on hiih leverage and big risks
without being fully aware that they are doing so. Consider the extent to
which the industries associated with housing, most notably construction,
ramped up, and the results thereof.8 2 This short-sighted risk taking sets
the economy up for a big fall when the bubble bursts." One way to justi-
fy the various securities law rules which mandate a degree of board risk
management84 is because of the systemic risk that predictably builds up
during market booms. We recognize that this is not the conventional jus-
tification for such rules, but the financial crisis has brought to the fore
concerns about systemic risk, and we believe that various elements of se-
curities and corporate law can and should be conceptualized and adapted
to help address those concerns.
We recognize that this is quite a broad treatment of systemic risk,
and that it tends to elide the distinction between systemic risk and simple
business risk and leverage. We do not want to push the point too far, but
a Minskyan understanding of how risk taking becomes contagious during
speculative bubbles suggests the two are indeed not easy to disentan-
81gle -there is no bright line dividing systemic and general business risk.
77. Writing on these matters is voluminous. One excellent source is BETHANY MCLEAN & JOE
NOCERA, ALL THE DEVILS ARE HERE: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (2010).
78. Brett McDonnell, Don't Panic! Defending Cowardly Interventions During and After a Fi-
nancial Crisis, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 7-9 (2011).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. HYMAN MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY 118 (1986).
82. McDonnell, supra note 78, at 9-11.
83. MINSKY, supra note 81, at 165-66.
84. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
85. MINSKY, supra note 81, at 197-220.
No. 3J 871
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
We also note that the law already does recognize a duty to a corpora-
tion's creditors in the zone of insolvency, thereby acknowledging a built-
in tendency of corporations focused on shareholder value to take on too
much risk in some circumstances. One way of making our point on sys-
temic risk is to note that, particularly during a speculative bubble, the
zone of insolvency can be much wider and more imminent than most
people realize, and that when many companies hit the zone at once, soci-
ety suffers. Society would benefit if corporate law could do a little to
nudge boards away from that zone.
Thus, corporations taking on a variety of kinds of business risk
without sufficient knowledge threaten both shareholders and society
generally. Indeed, the threat is as great as the threat from corporations
which flout the law. The doctrinal path is clear: to take seriously the
court's suggestion in Citigroup that business risk be treated like illegality
for purposes of Caremark duties.
IV. WHAT SHOULD THE DUTY TO MONITOR BE?
What form should the duty to monitor for business risk take? The
parameters of the duty should be informed by principles guiding fiduci-
ary duty law generally. In particular, we are mindful of the courts' ap-
propriate reluctance to micromanage business, embolden meritless litiga-
tion, and discourage people from joining boards because of the potential
scope of liability. We thus think that the duty should be strongest where
the potential harm is greatest and is easiest for the board to anticipate.
Returning to Goldman, the directors themselves put in place the com-
pensation system that motivated the harmful risk taking. But they are
far less chargeable with anticipating the extent of the harm.
Where are traditional agency costs in this analysis? Courts ought to
give more scrutiny to cases where such agency costs might cause difficul-
ties, either because such costs had the potential to cause harm, or be-
cause they had the potential to prevent directors from vigorously moni-
toring. Consider an example like Goldman, except where the
problematic compensation incentives were to top management who ef-
fectively appointed and retained the officers. 9 In such a case, simply by
reason of who got the compensation, we might want to look more closely
at the decision to grant the compensation, and the decision not to moni-
tor for the risk it might cause. But otherwise, we might be inclined to de-
fer more to a board unless they should have anticipated (or did antici-
pate) large harms.
86. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
87. In re Citigroup, Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 125 (Del. Ch. 2009).
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Liability would only be imposed for cases at the end of the continu-
um, where the potential harm was great, and the directors did anticipate
or should have anticipated it. But the penumbra would extend further,
and would be where we expect our proposal to have the most effect.
Boards would have what we will call here "Goldman duties"- to ask:
"Do we adequately understand the risks we are exposing ourselves to?
Is there something that the corporation is doing that might expose the
corporation, its shareholders, its other stakeholders, and/or the greater
society to risks we have not considered?" There is, after all, an economy
of scope in making this inquiry, given that the board arguably is charged
with making it anyway with respect purely to shareholder harms. As a
matter of aspirational best practices, the directors might even be encour-
aged to ask about the corporation's behavior that might have the poten-
tial to greatly harm the society whether or not it was to have a bad effect
on shareholders. Here, we are particularly mindful that we may be ask-
ing for an inquiry that asks everything and nothing. Moreover, what
sorts of harms might be cognizable in this context? Consider an analogy
with illegality: apparently, the directors owe a duty to monitor for illegal-
ity even if the illegality offers a net pecuniary benefit to shareholders.
Why not impose a like duty for risks of the sort we have been considering
here? One answer is that something being illegal reflects a societal con-
sensus that the behavior is disfavored; a broader duty may require an
amorphous and costly inquiry where no such consensus exists. But we
think this answer is not dispositive given what is at stake.
In any event, the mechanism would work mostly extra-legally,
through norms. Indeed, we would expect that liability would virtually
never occur under this approach. Courts occasionally might be willing,
however, to allow a case on this theory to proceed beyond the inevitable
motion to dismiss for failure to make demand (as indeed happened in
Citigroup, albeit on the waste theory rather than the Caremark claim9).
Such decisions allowing a case to continue would allow the courts to
preach with just a hint of a hammer behind their words, and it would in-
crease the settlement value of such cases, thereby providing some incen-
tive to bring the cases so that Delaware judges can come to the pulpit in
the first place."
Let us tie this analysis more closely to the existing legal structure of
Caremark duties, and ask in what ways a court applying our approach
would have written an opinion different from that in Goldman. First, un-
like the courts in Goldman and Citigroup, we would explicitly state that
the Caremark oversight duty includes a duty to monitor business risk
generally, not just the risk of breaking the law. We would stress that this
90. See In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 139-40.
91. See E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware Corporate
Law and Governance from 1992-2004? A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U. PA. L.
REV. 1399,1406 (2005).
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duty does not proscribe taking on any particular risks, or any general
level of risk. A corporation may take on as much risk as it likes. How-
ever, the board must take real effort to ensure that it understands what
risks are being undertaken, and that those risks are consistent with the
risk level that the board desires to undertake," and that among the risks
it has considered are risks to the greater society.
As articulated in Stone, directors can fail to meet their Caremark
duty in two ways. One is by not implementing some system of infor-
mation and control." As we have noted, enterprise risk management sys-
tems are now standard practice for public corporations. 94 Any system in
place, no matter how imperfectly designed will suffice. Some corpora-
tions, though, seem to have no enterprise risk management system in
place.95 These corporations will need to put a system in place, or risk fac-
ing liability.
Even if a corporation does have a system in place, the board may
still be liable if it consciously fails to monitor or oversee its system of in-
formation and control.96 We think courts should be less deferential than
they are-less deferential than they were in Goldman or Citigroup-in
making the determination that a board has or has not "consciously
failed." First, courts should look for evidence that the board, or its audit
committee (or both), has spent some time reviewing information gener-
ated by its risk monitoring system, and reviewing that system itself.
Guidance from the extensive enterprise risk management literature can
tell courts what sort of questions boards should be asking, and what sorts
of information they should be looking at.97 Given the fairly large audit
and risk management functions within both Goldman Sachs and
Citigroup, it is highly doubtful that plaintiffs could succeed on these
grounds; the value, again, would be in the encouragement that the direc-
tors go through the exercise of looking.
Beyond this, the board (in the first instance, and then the court if a
suit is brought) should look for red flags that something has gone wrong
within a company's risk management system. These red flags should not
be simply that some decisions led to big losses. Rather, one would look
for signs of self-interested, disloyal behavior, or rather, behavior that has
elements of disloyalty. There were at least two such signs in Goldman,
92. PROTIVITI, BOARD RISK OVERSIGHT: A PROGRESS REPORT 1-2 (2010) [hereinafter BOARD
RISK OVERSIGHT], available at http://www.coso.org/documents/Board-Risk-Oversight-Survey-coso-
protiviti.pdf.
93. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 373 (Del. 2006).
94. See supra note 64.
95. BOARD RISK OVERSIGHT, supra note 92, at 7.
96. In re Caremark Int'l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996). And here is
where we particularly hope a penumbra that expanded the effective reach of the duty might emerge,
motivating real efforts to become informed rather than focusing on limiting legal liability, perhaps
even through willful or semi-willful blindness that would prevent "conscious" awareness of something
the board should have been doing.
97. See BOARD RISK OVERSIGHT, supra note 92: RISK MANAGEMENT, supra note 64.
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and the court does not adequately respond to either of them. One sign is
the system of compensation at issue in the case, which created strong in-
centives for lower level employees to take on great risk.98 Such compen-
sation systems may well have played a major role in the financial crisis."
Having put such a system in place, the board should be on the lookout
for behavior which may predictably follow. As long as the incentive
problems are only at the lower level of an organization, we see this only
as a yellow flag. So long as the board and top officers are themselves
properly motivated, there is not much reason to distrust their judgment
in carrying out that duty. However, high-risk-inducing compensation
schemes at lower levels probably tend to mirror similar schemes at the
highest levels of the organization. Where that is so-as it presumably
was at Goldman itself, though it is not clear whether or not the plaintiffs
alleged as much (they should have!)-then there is less reason to trust
the board and top officers and the judgments they have made in setting
compensation schemes and monitoring risk. Indeed, even if the higher-
level managers' compensation scheme is not mirroring the lower-level
employee scheme, the higher level managers can presumably benefit
from the lower level managers' compensation-encouraged risky behav-
ior.
The other bothersome sign of disloyal behavior in Goldman con-
cerns an apparent tendency for the bank to engage in transactions in
which their interests were at odds with those of their clients, and in which
this was not clearly disclosed."0 One notorious example is the Abacus
deal. The court tries to minimize this as an isolated incident, but many
believe that it represented a growing trend and a disturbing break with
the company's past.o' Another example involves Citigroup, which en-
tered into a $285 million settlement with the SEC of allegations that it
had structured and marketed a portfolio on which it took a short posi-
tion, earning significant amounts for itself in profits and fees as its clients
lost their entire investment. 102 This is quite problematic for several rea-
sons: violating customers' trust risked destroying important reputational
capital, customers themselves are a corporate constituency who may mat-
ter to corporate law, and bankers who are willing to rip off customers are
probably bankers who are willing to rip off shareholders too.
98. See In re Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. S'holder Litig., No. 5215-VCG, 2011 WL 4826104, at *3
(Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2011).
99. McDonnell, supra note 78, at 11-12, 58-60.
100. In re Goldman Sachs, 2011 WL 4826104, at *4-5, 20.
101. See MCLEAN & NOCERA, supra note 77, at 268-73.
102. Citigroup and the SEC settled for $285 million; Judge Rakoff rejected the settlement, but the
SEC and Citi appealed, and the Second Circuit stayed his rejection, clearly indicating that it supported
the SEC practice. Congressional hearings on the subject were held, with most commentators support-
ing the SEC practice on the rationale that without it, no settlements would be made. See Claire A. Hill
& Richard Painter, Why S.E.C. Settlements Should Hold Senior Executives Liable, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (May 29, 2012, 11:28 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/why-s-e-c-settlements-
should-hold-senior-executives-liable/.
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These two red (or at least yellow) flags may conceivably have been
enough to avoid dismissal and allow the case to continue-we think that
is a close call. Absent more disturbing evidence revealed through dis-
covery, we do not think the facts as presented would justify ultimately
holding the defendants liable. The Caremark duty is indeed one of the
most difficult for plaintiffs to win, and for good reason. Whether or not
the court should have dismissed the case or allowed it to continue,
though, we think there is one more way in which the Goldman and
Citigroup courts went wrong: their rhetoric. These two companies were
at the heart of the worst worldwide financial crisis since the Great De-
pression. Certainly at Citigroup,0 those at the top do not seem to have
been adequately aware of the risks posed by subprime-related asset-
backed securities, and they did not ask questions about that risk that they
really should have asked. A corporate culture of high risk taking, moti-
vated and rewarded by huge bonuses that senior (and even junior) offic-
ers earned therefrom, seems to have prevailed throughout Wall Street,
with these two firms among the leaders in defining that culture.
This all cried out for a good ol' Delaware sermon. That is a big part
of what Delaware courts do. Even where they ultimately hold for the de-
fendants, they moralize where behavior has fallen well short of best prac-
tice aspirations. That moralizing may help in spreading and reinforcing
norms of proper board behavior.'0 Goldman and Citigroup both provid-
ed perfect opportunities to call out these defendants on what they did to
their shareholders, their clients, the country, and indeed the whole world.
Yet, there is little to nothing along those lines in either case. The
Citigroup court in particular seems quite defensive rhetorically, repeat-
edly invoking the business judgment rule, almost as a magic talisman.os
It is as if the Delaware courts were shocked by the tide of populist out-
rage which (quite rightly) has rolled across the United States, from all
sides of the political spectrum, and felt that they should not pile on, and
indeed, needed to defend the corporate system from which Delaware
judges so benefit. If this narrative is even partly true, an enormous op-
portunity is being squandered. Part of Delaware's role in defending this
system is forcefully calling to the attention of directors and officers areas
in which they need to do their jobs better. Surely one clear lesson of the
financial crisis is that risk management oversight is an area where boards,
especially the boards of systemically significant financial companies like
103. Indeed, there is evidence that Goldman saw the looming debacle of the subprime market
earlier than most of its competitors and acted to limit its losses, yielding significant losses for some of
its clients. See wILLIAM D. COHAN, MONEY AND POWER: How GOLDMAN SACHS CAME TO RULE
THE WORLD 489-546 (2011).
104. Hill & McDonnell, supra note 2, at 354; Johnson, supra note 7, at 79-87; Edward B. Rock,
Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1009, 1016 (1997);
Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-
Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1619, 1663 (2001); Velasco, supra note 7, at 13.
105. See In re Citigroup, Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 124-31 (Del. Ch. 2009).
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Goldman Sachs and Citigroup, need to step up their game.
How does what we argue for relate to the risk committee to be
mandated under Dodd-Frank? First, and most obviously, the committee
is only mandated for certain types of financial firms.' Our proposal
would apply to all types of firms. Second, even where the firm was re-
quired to have a risk committee, our proposal would serve as a helpful
adjunct. A private remedy can supplement scarce government resources.
The private bar's pursuit of companies that could be pursued by the SEC
may be a mixed bag, but it is surely not unambiguously bad. But most
importantly, what we seek as much as law on the books is law in action-
the penumbra, or the norms, that very much influence the behavior of
corporate actors. The risk committee requirement will be of a piece with
our broader concern that boards focus more on risk, not just because of
the steps firms will take to meet the requirement, but also because law
will be thereby expressing its views as to, and making more salient, the
board's and the firm's role in risk inquiries. It will thus complement the
force of our proposal, which relies in significant part on the importance
of what Delaware judges say as much as how they rule in their opinions.
V. CONCLUSION
One of the canonical roles for boards is to monitor. So, why are du-
ty to monitor lawsuits so hard to win? Put differently, why does the duty
to monitor require as little as it does? One straightforward answer is that
corporate law's well-known reluctance to micromanage business leads it
to be very uncomfortable second-guessing business decisions; here, the
micromanagement would have to go deeper, to second-guess something
that was not done and perhaps should have been. The reluctance to mi-
cromanage is of course of a piece with a desire to limit meritless suits.
Allowing suits for things that should have been done but were not might
open the door wide indeed. Put differently, corporate law is most com-
fortable scrutinizing behavior that implicates conflicts of interest in
straightforward ways. The duty to monitor smacks of inattention, a type
of conduct the law feels far less comfortable overseeing. Thus, the doc-
trine as now articulated provides that when failure to monitor is actiona-
ble, it is because the failure is tantamount to an action-an intentional
failure "to act in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a con-
scious disregard for [the board member's] duties."" Most failures that
come to mind are passive, not active; thus, not surprisingly, a claim that a
board breached its fiduciary duty by failing to monitor almost never suc-
ceeds.
106. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
107. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006), quoted approvingly in
Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d. 362, 369 (Del. 2006) and many other cases including In re Goldman Sachs
Grp., Inc. S'holder Litig., No. 5212-VCG, 2011 WL 4826104, at *13 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2011).
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We think the duty should require more. One way to articulate why
we think this is so arises from the financial crisis. Corporations behaved
in ways that enormously harmed the greater society and their sharehold-
ers. They would not have behaved as they did but for the fact that cor-
porate law grants owners limited liability.' It seems to us that the privi-
lege of limited liability can be abused, and was, and that one way to limit
its abuse is for directors to try to anticipate the abuses that might occur.
This role for directors must of course be circumscribed lest they be left
with an amorphous duty to look for everything. But we think the plain-
tiffs' articulation in the Goldman case describes the sort of thing direc-
tors should be doing. We do not believe that the directors in the case
should have been liable for a breach of fiduciary duties for failing to
monitor. But we do that we think that when they are or should be in-
formed about a matter of importance to the company, whether or not
they are making an affirmative decision, directors ought routinely to be
asking themselves the questions: Might significant negative externalities
result as well as potential harm to shareholders? If so, what should we
be monitoring or overseeing to minimize the possibility of those external-
ities and harms? In the Goldman case, directors were aware of the com-
pensation scheme they had adopted.'" They were, or should have been,
aware of the incentives it produced. Monitoring on a regular basis to see
how those incentives had motivated behavior would have been appropri-
ate and advisable. Should failure to do so trigger liability? Almost nev-
er, but we do think that monitoring in this manner is part of the board's
duty. What should be the board be monitoring for? Business risk,
broadly construed: risk of harm to the corporation and its shareholders,
especially where accompanied by risk of harm to the society. The duty
should be most acute where the board itself put in place an important
contributor to the harm; it should, however, be present generally.
A final point: we think that to some extent, the narrow reach of the
duty to monitor, especially its penumbra, is an infelicitous effect of lan-
guage. "Loyalty" was made the umbrella characterization in Stone for
breaches involving monitoring when the duty of good faith was sub-
sumed under the duty of loyalty.no Breaching the duty of loyalty means
that one is "disloyal." Breaching the duty of good faith has come to
mean acting in affirmative bad faith. This is so certainly insofar as what
is at issue is potential liability; the language characterizing the duty of
good faith as requiring only an absence of affirmative bad faith has, we
would argue, influenced the penumbra of law as well, the duties directors
abide by even if liability could not attach for failing to do so. Law's tradi-
tional and appropriate reluctance in the business area to micromanage
business decisions and give litigious plaintiffs fodder for meritless law-
108. See Hill & Painter, supra note 4, at 1177.
109. In re Goldman Sachs, 2011 WL 4826104, at *3, * 13.
110. Stone, 911 A.2d at 369-70.
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suits has caused the duty to monitor to be more limited than we think it
needs to be. Recent events have shown that even though treading into
the murkier waters of risk oversight generally has, dare we say it, risks, it
is necessary and advisable. The crisis serves as powerful evidence of the
perils of doing too little.
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